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ABSTRACT
This Article explores whether the modern corporate governance model
is sustainable. For many corporations, particularly large ones, there is a
separation between ownership and management, with a management
emphasis on short-term gains at the expense of long-term sustainability.
This Article explores the role of corporate directors, particularly vis-ii-vis
shareholders, from an interdisciplinary perspective, analyzing legal case
law as well as legal, management, and finance literature. This Article
explores emerging trends in expanding notions of corporate governance
that incorporate concerns beyond just shareholders, recognizing the
interrelationship between business and society. It is suggested that in
order to remain viable and competitive, corporations need to normalize
longer views of sustainability which encompass numerous stakeholders,
rather than simply trying to maximize profits during a current quarter.
* J.D., M.B.A. Assistant Professor, Department of Management & Marketing,
University of Wyoming College of Business. The author thanks Aaron J. Lyttle, J.D.,
University of Wyoming College of Law, 2010, for his excellent research assistance for
this paper.
48 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:047
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 49
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CORPORATE FORM OF BUSINESS ................ 51
II. THE NATURE OF THE MODERN CORPORATION ................................... 59
III. MODERN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
STANDARDS-DEFERENCE TO DIRECTORS ..................................... 67
IV. QUESTIONING THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
APPROACH TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ..................................... 72
V. EVOLVING NORMATIVE STANDARDS FOR
SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE .................................... 80
C ONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 81
BEYOND SHAREHOLDER VALUE
INTRODUCTION
This Article explores whether the modem corporate governance model
is sustainable. The corporation is unquestionably an important element of
the United States economy. Although not the most prevalent form of
business-representing less than 20 percent of business organizations-
corporations generate approximately 80 percent of American business
revenues.' Throughout history, the corporate form has served as the most
2appropriate vehicle to raise and marshal substantial resources.
From its formal inception, the corporation has offered two principal
advantages: legal existence separate from its owners and transferability of
owners' interests in the corporation. Separate legal existence allows the
corporation to own assets, enter contracts, and incur liabilities that are
legally separate from those of its owners and managers. 3 Importantly, not
only are the owners' personal assets shielded from the corporation's
creditors,4 but also the corporate assets are shielded from the claims of the
owners' personal creditors.5 Transferability of ownership means that the
corporation does not need to liquidate in the event that one or more
owners wish to terminate their interest in the firm.
6
For many corporations, particularly large ones, there is a separation
between ownership and management. How can the corporation's owners
1. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics of Income, Number of Tax Returns, Receipts, and
Net Income by Type of Business, tbl.722, available at http://www.census.gov/
compendia/statab/tables/09s0722/xls, (last visited Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Statistics of
Income] (reflecting 2005 tax returns). These same basic proportions are reflected in data
for 1970 as well as studies covering 1945-1950. Id. See Betty C. Churchill, The Business
Population by Legal Form of Organization, 31 SURV. OF CURRENT Bus. 9 (1951),
available at http://library.bea.gov/cgibin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/SCB5&CISOPTP=
29&CISOMODE=print. Total corporate receipts were over $24 trillion in 2005, with total
net income of nearly $2 trillion. Statistics of Income, supra.
2. See, e.g., Alfred D. Chandler, Organizational Capabilities and the Economic
History of the Industrial Enterprise, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 79, 79 (1992) (noting that firms
have been the main vehicles for the production and distribution of goods).
3. Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the
Firm, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1333, 1336 (2006).
4. See, e.g., id. at 1339 (contrasting a corporation with a general partnership form of
business in which, for example, a bankruptcy trustee may hold general partners
personally liable for partnership debts not satisfied with partnership assets); see also, 11
U.S.C. § 723 (2006) (authorizing a partnership trustee to proceed against a partner for
debts owed by the partnership).
5. Hansmann et al., supra note 3, at 1336.
6. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REv. 387, 392 (2003).
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(the shareholders/stockholders) be assured that the managers (directors
and officers) will not pursue their own personal gains over those of the
owners? 7 The answer is that the managers of the corporation act
essentially as trustees of corporate resources and as agents of the owners.
8
Managers may not use corporate resources for their own purposes in
conflict with their duties to shareholders.
9
In theory, imposing fiduciary duties upon corporate managers to
protect the property interests of shareholders is the preferred approach. 10
After all, "millions of individuals are willing to turn over a significant
portion of their wealth to organizations run by managers who may have
little interest in their welfare."" Additionally, these investors are residual
claimants-they rely on the managers to operate the firm profitably so
earnings will accrue to the shareholders. 12
Shareholders invest in corporations with the understanding that
managers will strive to maximize shareholder value-i.e., maximize
7. The English philosopher Adam Smith discussed this dichotomy, noting
that:
Like the stewards of a rich man, [directors] are apt to consider attention
to small matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily give
themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion,
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the
affairs of such a company.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
700 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modem Library 1937) (1776).
8. See Wardell v. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 651, 657 (1881) (holding that directors are
"clothed with power to manage the affairs of the company for the benefit of its
stockholders and creditors. Their character as agents forbade the exercise of their powers
for their own personal ends against the interest of the company."); Lofland v. Cahall, 118
A. 1, 3 (Del. 1922) ("Directors of a corporation are trustees for the stockholders and their
acts are governed by the rules applicable to such a relation, which exact of them the
utmost good faith and fair dealing, especially where their individual interests are
concerned."). See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
308-10 (1976) (discussing agency costs associated with corporate management).
9. See supra note 8.
10. See Emma D. Enriquez, Honor Thy Shareholder at All Costs? Towards a Better
Understanding of the Fiduciary Duties of Directors or Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries, 32
Sw. U. L. REv. 97, 112 (2003) (arguing that the imposition of fiduciary duties on
corporate managers serves to protect the property rights of shareholders).
11. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 330 (paraphrasing Armen A. Alchian,
Corporate Management and Property Rights, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE
REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 337 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1969)).
12. Id.
[Vol. 1:047
BEYOND SHAREHOLDER VALUE
profits.' 3 But is this so-called shareholder primacy theory of profit
maximization sustainable? This Article explores issues related to that
question, starting with a brief overview of the historical development of
corporations and their role in the American economy. The role of
corporate directors is considered next, particularly vis-A-vis shareholders,
from an interdisciplinary perspective, analyzing case law as well as legal,
management, and finance literature. Recent trends suggest that the major
role of large, publicly-traded corporations is not so much to maximize the
wealth of their shareholders, but rather to maximize the wealth of
investors-that is, they exist not necessarily to build a lasting business, but
to provide continually increasing short-term profits. 14 It is argued that this
approach is not sustainable from a long-term competitive perspective.
5
This Article explores emerging trends in expanding notions of
corporate governance that incorporate concerns beyond just shareholders,
recognizing the interrelationship between business and society. It then
suggests that in order to remain viable and competitive, corporations need
to normalize longer views of sustainability that encompass numerous
stakeholders, rather than simply trying to maximize profits during the
current quarter.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CORPORATE FORM OF BUSINESS
The immediate precursor to the corporation can be traced to joint-stock
companies that offered transferrable shares of ownership, appearing as
early as the thirteenth century. 16 The first English joint-stock company
was formed in 1554, and the first joint-stock company to operate in
13. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 646 (2006) (describing shareholder primacy as
the obligation of corporate decision-makers to focus on shareholder interests and noting
that it is a dominant principle in corporate law).
14. See Morris G. Danielson, Jean L. Heck & David R. Shaffer, Shareholder
Theory-How Opponents and Proponents Both Get It Wrong, J. APPLIED FIN. 62, 62
(2008).
15. See generally id.
.16. See Charles Sumner Lobingier, The Natural History of the Private Artificial
Person: A Comparative Study in Corporate Origins, 13 TUL. L. REv. 41, 58 (1938).
Lobingier traces the origins of "artificial relationships" back to fosterage in Roman
society, adoptions, and "blood brother" associations dating back to primitive societies. Id
at 42; see also Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before
1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 106 (1888) [hereinafter Williston, Part 1] (discussing the first
fictitious legal persons dating back to ancient Rome and Greece).
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America was formed in 1587.17 In England, formal chartering of a joint-
stock company required special permission by the Crown or an act of
Parliament. 8  Typical of the joint-stock companies formed during this
time was the East India Company, chartered by Queen Elizabeth in 1600,
granting a monopoly to an association of merchants trading in the East
Indies.' 9 Because the expense of outfitting ships for voyages, often taking
several years to complete, was too great for individual merchants, the East
India Company offered the financial opportunity for "noblemen,
gentlemen, shopkeepers, widows, orphans, and all other subjects [to] be
traders, and employ their capital in a joint stock," with profits to be
distributed in the same proportion as the amounts contributed. 20 "In fact
the whole advance of English discovery, commerce, and colonization in
the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was due not to individuals
but to the efforts of corporate bodies." 21 These early corporations had a
direct or quasi-governmental purpose, legitimizing a range of public
functions performed by foreign trading companies like "organizing terms
of trade, setting up local governments, controlling customs, and ... making
foreign policy in their areas of operation." 22 General civil corporations
were also formed for the benefit of cities and towns, while other "special"
corporations were formed to promote specific governmental objectives,
such as facilitating trade, promoting charity, or running hospitals.
2y
17. See Lobingier, supra note 16, at 58. The American joint-stock company was
under an "indenture of graunt" from Sir Walter Raleigh to thirteen "of London,
Gentlemen," who were declared a body corporate as "Gouvernour and assistants of the
Citie of Raleigh in Virginia." Id. (footnote omitted).
18. Parliament, however, seldom exercised this right directly, but rather it generally
confirmed charters granted by the crown. JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, 1 ESSAYS IN THE
EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 6 (Law Book Exchange 2006) (1917).
19. Williston, Part I, supra note 16, at 109-10. The formal name of the company was
"the Company of Merchants of London, trading to the East Indies." Id. at 109.
20. Id. at 109; see also Edward P. Cheyney, Some English Conditions Surrounding
the Settlement of Virginia, 12 AM. HIST. REV. 507, 511 (1907) ("The multiplicity and
extent of costs involved in procuring and fitting out vessels, in providing military
equipment and all other supplies for mariners and colonists, and in supporting employees
and settlers; the long waiting for any returns; the slight development of instruments of
credit-these made demands beyond the means of any individual gentleman or group of
gentlemen, burdened as they already were by the living expenses of their rank.").
21. Cheyney, supra note 20, at 512.
22. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 4 (1970).
23. See Williston, PartI, supra note 16, at 110.
[Vol. 1:047
BEYOND SHAREHOLDER VALUE
Just as the free transferability of stock protects corporations from
liquidation demands by stockholders, it also creates a secondary market in
that stock. As the number of joint-stock companies grew, secondary
trading in their stock increased, to the extent that speculation by "stock-
jobbers" in "Exchange Alley" in London became the rage in the early part
of the eighteenth century.24 As an offshoot of rampant speculation in the
stock of one charted company, the South-Sea Company, hundreds of joint-
stock "Bubble" companies were formed between 1719 and 1720, many
lasting only two weeks or less.25 The number of enterprises seeking to
raise capital far outstripped the number of charters Parliament or the
Crown were willing to grant; therefore, most Bubble companies only
imitated joint-stock companies since they lacked a government charter.26
In July 1720, the English government tried to tame the speculation by
dismissing all petitions for charters and declaring illegal all Bubble
companies. 2 7 Specifically, by passing the Bubble Act,28 Parliament made
it illegal to act as a corporation, including issuing transferable stock,
without a charter.2 9 Thus the world's first stock bubble was burst.3 °
24. CHARLES MACKAY, MEMOIRS OF EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS 50 (L.C.
Page & Co. 1932) (1841); Williston, Part I, supra note 16, at 111.
25. See MACKAY, supra note 24, at 54. Historians have described joint-stock
speculation in 1720 as a year "of fantasy, panic, folly, and grotesqueness." Ron Harris,
The Bubble Act: Its Passage and Its Effects on Business Organization, 54 J. ECON. HIST.
610, 610 (1994). Stock trading became such a mania in 1720 London that one prospectus
to raise half a million pound sterling described the venture as "[a] company for carrying
on an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody to know what it is." MACKAY, supra
note 24, at 55 (internal quotations omitted). This particular promoter was able to raise
2,000 pound sterling, never to be seen again. Id. at 55-56. It is estimated that nearly one
and one-half million pound sterling was won and lost by speculating in these Bubble
companies, "to the impoverishment of many a fool, and the enriching of many a rogue."
Id. at 54.
26. Blair, supra note 6, at 415; Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay
on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REv. 873, 887 (2000) (arguing that "what
frequently distinguished incorporated from unincorporated joint-stock companies ... was
that the former were owned by politically well-connected merchants who had paid a
handsome price to secure a monopoly, while the latter lacked the money or connections
to gain similar privileges").
27. See MACKAY, supra note 24, at 57-63.
28. Bubble Act, 1720, 6 Geo. c. 18 (Eng.). The nickname "Bubble Act" became
popular in the early nineteenth century. Harris, supra note 25, at 614.
29. Mahoney, supra note 26, at 887.
30. Harris, supra note 25, at 610. The bursting of the South-Sea bubble "constituted
the first international stock market bust[; a] crisis that.. .threatened to unravel the whole
web of English public finance." But see Julian Hoppit, Financial Crises in Eighteenth-
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Although the bursting of the South Sea Bubble engendered "great
distrust in corporate enterprises," 3' and despite passage of the Bubble Act,
unchartered joint-stock companies continued to be created and operated
until the repeal of the Act in 1825.32 "[C]orporate charters were difficult
and expensive to obtain, the fruit of special privilege, and unincorporated
joint stock companies conducted business outside the recognition and
protection of the law."33 According to Mahoney, as a result of the Bubble
Act, there was no development of a common law of joint-stock companies
until the Act's repeal. 34 Judges, who had not dealt with these joint-stock
entities, were reluctant to provide them with their own set of legal rules.
35
The Bubble Act was extended to the American colonies in 1741.36
According to Williston, Pennsylvania became the first colony to charter a
corporation in 1768, and only five more charters were issued in America
prior to 1787.37 Upon enactment of the United States Constitution, the
authority to issue corporate charters passed to the individual states,38 but
Century England, 39 EcoN. HIST. REV. 39, 48 (1986) (suggesting that the South-Sea
bubble mostly impacted merchants and that "[f]or the business community as a whole,
through the length and breadth of England, the Bubble was not a catastrophe").
31. Williston, Part I, supra note 16, at 112.
32. Mahoney, supra note 26, at 888 (footnote omitted).
33. Kenneth K. Luce, Trends in Modern Corporation Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV.
1291, 1293 (1952) (footnote omitted).
34. Mahoney, supra note 26, at 888. "The notion of separate legal personality without
incorporation had ceased to reside in the judicial mind." Id. But see Harris, supra note
25, at 623 (arguing that it was not the Bubble Act that deprived the Bubble companies of
corporate privileges, but rather common law). Harris argues that "[t]he legal ambiguity of
the [Bubble Act], together with a weak enforcement mechanism ... and a wide-spread
disregard of it by businessmen, made it practically a dead letter." Id. The Bubble Act was
never invoked against an unincorporated joint-stock company in America. HURST, supra
note 22, at 8. Alternatively, English Courts of Equity accepted the legitimacy of pooling
assets by a deed of settlement, which put the pooled resources in the control of trustees to
manage them for designated business purposes, and recognized the transferability of
shares in those pools. Id. at 6 (also noting such business arrangements could be
designated as "limited," providing notice to creditors that owners would have limited
liability for debts).
35. Mahoney, supra note 26, at 888.
36. 1741, 14 Geo. 2, c. 37 (Eng.); see also Luce, supra note 33, at 1293 n.14.
37. Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2
HARV. L. REV. 149, 165-66 (1888) [hereinafter Williston, Part I1]. In fact, "[in colonial
days ... American corporations for business purposes were few and relatively
unimportant." 2 DAVIS, supra note 18, at 4. Davis records seven corporate charters during
the colonial period. Id. at 22.
38. Blair, supra note 6, at 415; Luce, supra note 33, at 1293. The U.S. Constitution
makes no mention of corporations, and American citizens generally accepted "the
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only a handful of states, such as Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, and
Pennsylvania, initially passed the necessary legislation providing for these
charters. 39 Though estimates vary, it appears that fewer than 335 corporate
charters had been granted in the United States by the end of the eighteenth
century, 295 of those in the last decade of the century.40 In contrast to
England earlier in the eighteenth century, speculation in corporate
securities in America was minimal.4'
Incorporation in America required a special act of a state legislature
until approximately the mid-nineteenth century.42 Following the economic
depression of 1837-1844, many states held constitutional conventions
where the states added provisions separating corporate business oppor-
tunities from state politics.43 Legislatures began to enact general
incorporation statutes under which anyone could organize a business
corporation by preparing and filing articles of incorporation, 44 resulting in
a watershed moment in the development of the modem American
corporation.4 5
legitimacy of [state] legislative determinations as to how far the corporate device should
be used." HURST, supra note 22, at 113 (footnote omitted). "Whether the corporate
privilege shall be granted or withheld is always a matter of state policy." Louis K. Liggett
Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 545 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
39. Williston, Part II, supra note 37, at 165; Lobingier, supra note 16, at 67.
40. 2 DAVIS, supra note 18, at 22-23. Massachusetts and Connecticut granted the
most charters during this period; a combined 30 percent. Id. Davis also classifies the
purposes of these charters, from colonial times through 1800: Financial (banking and
insurance) 20 percent; Highway (inland navigation, toll-bridges, and turnpikes) 65
percent; Local Public Service (water supplies and docks) 11 percent; and Business
(manufacturing, mining, agriculture, land, and commercial) 4 percent. Id.; see also Blair,
supra note 6, at 389 n.3. But see Williston, Part II, supra note 37, at 166 (stating that by
the end of the eighteenth century approximately 100 charters had been issued, half in
Massachusetts).
41. 2 DAVIS, supra note 18, at 294.
42. Luce, supra note 33, at 1294.
43. RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BusINEss CORPORATION
1784-1855, at 179-80 (1982).
44. Luce, supra note 33, at 1294 (noting that demands for special charters had led to
widespread corruption in obtaining charters). New York, for example, amended its
constitution in 1846 to allow corporations, in all but limited, special circumstances, to be
formed under the general laws, versus special acts of the legislature. See William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 664
(1974) (citing N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1846)).
45. SEAVOY, supra note 43, at 180.
2010]
56 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
While many of the early American corporations were devoted to quasi-
governmental purposes, such as building canals and toll roads, 46 it was the
surge of manufacturing businesses seeking incorporation coupled with the
growing railroad concerns needing substantial capital that drove the need
for general purpose incorporation legislation. 47 "By 1886 the corporation
... was becoming dominant in important lines of manufacturing and [was]
being used to a substantial extent for conducting many other types of
business enterprises.
'' 8
By the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century,
American business began to expand into nationwide activities and
compete globally in a number of industrial segments, requiring high levels
of mass-production.49 The industrial enterprises that dominated America's
most vital industries by the end of the nineteenth century-the archetypes
of today's large, publicly-held corporations-resulted from the integration
of the processes of mass production and mass distribution within a single
firm.50 The corporate form of business was ideal for this environment,
providing a means to finance increasing capital costs as well as a
mechanism for managing resources.
5 1
In 1896 New Jersey adopted what is regarded as the first of the fully
modem corporation statutes. 52 In 1899 Delaware enacted its modernized
General Corporation Law. 53 Although the law was modeled after New
46. 2 DAVIS, supra note 18, at 22-23; Williston, Part I, supra note 37, at 166.
47. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law,
1886-1936, 50 HARv. L. REV. 27, 28 (1936); see also infra note 59 and accompanying
text.
48. Dodd, supra note 47, at 29. "[W]hile individual entrepreneurs and partnerships
played a larger part in the economic life of the [mid-nineteenth century] than they do
today, it was already coming to be true that in enacting corporation laws the legislatures
were furnishing the framework within which industry and commerce were to be
organized." Id. (emphasis in original).
49. Id.
50. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 285 (1977).
51. MARY O'SULLIVAN, CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 72-73 (2000).
52. Cary, supra note 44, at 664.
53. Act of March 10, 1899, ch. 273, 21 Del. Laws 445. Delaware had twice
previously enacted general purpose corporation laws, but they contained numerous
restrictions preventing easy incorporation. For example, an 1875 amendment to the
Delaware Constitution permitted general incorporations, but only for specific business
endeavors, and the legislation enacted from this amendment required a Superior Court
judge's approval of the articles of incorporation; an 1883 corporation act simplified the
procedure somewhat, but still required judge approval. See S. Samuel Arsht, A History of
Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4-5 (1976). Meanwhile, the Delaware
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Jersey's corporation statute, Delaware's General Corporation Law soon
became the most popular in the United States because of "three principal
features: a simple procedure for formation; low corporate taxes; and a
broad statement of the powers granted to the corporation by the State.,
54
Delaware's laws granted to corporations the power to conduct business in
other states, to hold stocks and bonds of other companies, and the power
to merge, as well as limited shareholder liability to the amount of their
investment 5 Initial liberalization of incorporation laws by New Jersey
and Delaware sparked competition among a handful of states to further
liberalize their own statutes to compete for corporate charters.5 6  in
particular, these updated laws allowed those controlling the corporation
the opportunity to create the corporate structure most favorable to
management by writing both the charter and the bylaws.5 7 For example,
revisions in the 1920s to Delaware's General Corporation Law "gave
almost unlimited power to directors vis-At-vis investors, [attesting to] the
importance attached to a free hand for those who sat atop broad
stockholder constituencies.
'" 58
From the financial perspective, larger businesses needed to raise
capital far beyond the capacity of a few investors. For example, capital
injected into the railroad network rose from $300 million in 1850 to over
$21 billion in 1916. 59 As a consequence, a financial industry arose to
facilitate raising large sums of capital from a large number of people. By
the second decade of the twentieth century, publicly held stocks and bonds
Constitution still permitted applications to the legislature for special corporate charters.
Id. at 5. The 1897 Delaware Constitution, which authorized the 1899 General Corpor-
ation Law, prohibited any further special incorporations. Id. at 6.
54. Arsht, supra note 53, at 7 (citations omitted). Cary also notes that in 1913, "at the
insistence of Governor Woodrow Wilson, New Jersey drastically tightened its law
relating to corporations," allowing Delaware to take a lead in corporate charters that it
has never lost. Cary, supra note 44, at 664.
55. Arsht, supra note 53, at 7.
56. Id. at 1-7.
57. HURST, supra note 22, at 149.
58. Id. at 148-49 (footnote omitted).
59. R.C. MICHIE, THE LONDON AND NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGES 1850-1914, at
222 (1987).
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financed most of the leading economic sectors in the United States.60 By
1912, securities represented 19 percent of total United States assets.
6 1
The combination of relaxed corporation codes and increased need for
capital is reflected in the number of incorporations each year in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There were never more than 1,000
incorporations in any single year in the United States prior to 1880, with
an average of approximately 250 incorporations per year from 180062
through 1879. However, annual new incorporations exceeded 5,000 in
1892 and 10,000 in 1901, peaking at over 45,000 by 1929 before falling
precipitously to just over 12,000 by 1943.63 After 1943 no one has
compiled state-by-state annual incorporations. The United States Census
Bureau began tracking the total number of corporations in the United
States beginning in 1916.64 The aggregate data reflect a similar trend, with
341,000 total corporations in the United States in 1916, peaking at
533,000 in 1935 before a decline through 1946. 65 Since the mid-1940s,
there has been a steady increase in the number of corporations in the
United States, reaching 1 million in 1958,66 and climbing to over 5.5
million in 2005.67 Though Delaware has long had the reputation of being
60. Id. at 223. In 1913, for example, AT&T raised nearly $350 million in capital from
just over 53,000 shareholders; U.S. Steel had just over $500 million in common stock
outstanding among just over 44,000 shareholders; and General Motors, small by
comparison, had capital stock of $31.5 million held by just under 3,000 shareholders. Id.
61. Id. at 221.
62. GEORGE HEBERTON EVANS, JR., BUSINESS INCORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1800-1943, at 95-151 app. 3 (1948). Exact numbers of incorporations during the
nineteenth century are not available. The U.S. Census Bureau did not begin collecting
corporate statistics until 1916. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. Limited figures
for total incorporations in specific states during the nineteenth century are available. For
example, New Jersey, 1791-1875: 2,318; Pennsylvania, 1790-1860: 2,333; and
Wisconsin, 1848-1871: 1,130. HURST, supra note 22, at 17-18. All of these were special
charters. Id. This snippet of figures clearly indicates that even with the requirements of
special charters, incorporations were growing dramatically in the nineteenth century
compared to the eighteenth century.
63. EvANs, supra note 62, at app. 3.
64. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 914 ser. V, at 41-53 (1976).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Statistics of Income, supra note 1.
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the most popular state in which to incorporate, 68 it was never home to
more than 20 percent of incorporations between 1800 and 1943.69
Since the mid-twentieth century, however, Delaware has maintained
its prominence, primarily because it initially attained the status as the
preferred state for incorporation due to its liberal laws. Recently, the
Delaware Division of Corporations has boasted that Delaware is the
corporate home of 64 percent of the Fortune 500 companies. 7' This is
significant because, for example, in 2005, the largest 500 American
companies, out of nearly 30 million business entities, generated 28 percent
of total United States business revenues.72
II. THE NATURE OF THE MODERN CORPORATION
The shareholder primacy theory "derives from the concept that the
shareholders are the owners of the corporation and, as such, are entitled to
control it, determine its fundamental policies, and decide whether to make
fundamental shifts in corporate policy and practice." 73 Before corporations
expanded in size and professionalism, "owners managed and managers
owned.",7 4 As corporations began to grow and dominate economic activity
in the United States, commentators began to examine the role of
governance in the evolving corporate culture. Writing in 1932, Berle and
Means noted the widening dispersion of stock ownership, particularly
68. See, e.g., Arsht, supra note 53, at 1 (noting a general consensus that Delaware has
the most popular corporation law).
69. EVANS, supra note 62.
70. In 1956, approximately one-third of the largest industrial, merchandising, and
utility companies in the United States were incorporated in Delaware. HURST, supra note
22, at 150.
71. 2008 DEL. Div. OF CORPS. ANN. REP., available at http://corp.delaware.gov/
2008AR.pdf. In its 2007 Annual Report, the Delaware Division of Corporations claimed
that half of all United States firms traded on the New York and NASDAQ stock
exchanges were charted in Delaware. 2007 DEL. DEP'T OF STATE Div. OF CORPS, ANN.
REP., available at http://corp.delaware. gov/2007DivCorpAR.pdf.
72. Revenues for the largest 500 American companies based on Fortune 500,
FORTUNE, 2005, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500
archive/full/2005 (last visited Jan. 26, 2010). The total number of U.S. business entities
and their total revenues in 2005 are based on Statistics of Income, supra note 1. Based on
these same sources, the top 1,000 firms generated just under 33 percent of total business
revenues in 2005.
73. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm
Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1327 (1992).
74. CHANDLER, supra note 50, at 9.
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among the largest corporations. 75 They observed that as a result, control of
the corporation was passing from the shareholders to the directors. 76 The
shareholder was evolving from a holder of rights in the property,
management, and wealth of the corporation, to essentially a bondholder-
merely a supTplier of capital with minimal power to participate in
management. Berle and Means argued that this separation of control
from ownership led to a perverse logic: any profits exceeding a "fair
return" should be distributed to those in control to induce them to manage
efficiently, an idea that resulted in corporations operating in the financial
interests of management, leaving shareholders "merely the recipients of
the wages of capital.,
78
Berle and Means were reacting to the fact that the process of raising
significant amounts of capital from large numbers of investors led to a
separation of equity ownership from strategic control over the allocation
of corporate resources, which was increasingly vested in the hands of
career managers. 79 The role of the shareholder began to change from one
of "owner" to "investor," along with a commensurate change of attitude
by management toward the shareholder. In management's view,
shareholders play a passive role in the corporation, buying or selling
shares based solely on price fluctuations. 8 "Stockholders know nothing
about the business nor do they care anything about it."
81
But shareholder primacy was not abandoned as the number of
shareholders increased while their participation in management decreased.
75. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 47 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932).
76. Id. at 244.
77. Id. at 245.
78. Id. at 302.
79. O'SULLIVAN, supra note 51, at 75.
[The corporation] is an arrangement by which hundreds of thousands of
men who would in days gone by have set up in business for themselves
put their money into a single huge accumulation and place the entire
direction of its employment in the hands of men they have never seen,
with whom they never confer.
Woodrow Wilson, Before the War: How Things Looked Then, in WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY,
MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 3, 5 (1927).
80. JOSEPHINE YOUNG CASE & EVERETr NEEDHAM CASE, OWEN D. YOUNG AND
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 371-72 (1982).
81. Id. (quoting a 1926 letter written by Owen D. Young, Chairman of the Board of
Directors of General Electric, from 1922-1939, 1942-1945) (original quotations omitted);
see also Past Leaders, Owen D. Young, http://www.ge.com/company/history/bios/owen_
young. html (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
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In the 1960s, the "shareholder value" approach began to dominate
corporate practice: "There is one and only one social responsibility of
business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase
its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say,
engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.,
82
Theoretically, if firms devoted their resources to maximizing profits, the
interests of the shareholders would be protected. This approach dovetailed
nicely with the historic role of management, which satisfied Adam
Smith's concern of ensuring that shareholder interests were protected from
managers who had possibly conflicting priorities. 83 "Corporate officers
and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence
to further their private interests."
84
Shortly thereafter, a principal-agent theory began to take hold-
shareholders, who are unable or unwilling to actively manage the
corporation, are principals who appoint directors as their agents to run the
business. 85 The principal-agent theory addressed not only methods to
82. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM & FREEDOM 133 (1963); see Elletta Sangrey
Callahan et al., Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance:
Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and Employee
Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 180 (2002) (discussing contractarianism, an
environment wherein maximizing shareholder value also maximizes value for other
stakeholders). "Nonshareholder constituencies are presumed to be able to bargain with
the corporation to protect their interests. Thus, market forces-including the managerial
labor market, the product market, and the market for corporate control-provide the
ultimate check on organizational wrongdoing by penalizing inefficiencies." Id. at 180-81
(footnote omitted).
83. See SMITH, supra note 7.
84. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a
profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has
established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director,
peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his
duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation
committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that
would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or
advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to
enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers.
Id.
85. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8; see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C.
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 312 (1983); Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 740-41
(1997).
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prevent managers from stealing capital from shareholders, 86 but also
methods to address managers' self-interested motives that differed from
the shareholder primacy/profit maximization priorities of the firm.
87
"Given information asymmetry between principals and agents-that is, the
agents are much better informed both about their own actions and about
their outcomes-it is never likely to be optimal for the agents to act in a
way that is optimal for the principals." ° Jensen, Meckling, and Fama
argued that shareholders can ensure managers act in the shareholders' best
interests through monitoring and incentives. 89 Incentives for management
can be increased to minimize monitoring costs.9° As a result, managers
have been financially rewarded for maximizing shareholder value in
firms. 91 "For most economists and legal scholars, the debate is more about
how to implement shareholder value than about its legitimacy. Much of
this debate focuses on what constitutes an efficient monitoring
structure."
92
The time horizon for management's incentives is also critical. Too
short of a time horizon can result in management pursuing high, short-
term profits at the expense of future profitability, particularly if the
managers leave after the high-profit period. 93 Granting stock options can
lessen short-termism, since stock prices also incorporate anticipated future
performance of the firm.94 The problem is, however, that because
managers' compensation will potentially decline if the corporation's share
price also declines, managers will therefore become more risk-averse.
95
86. See, e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 85, at 737.
87. See, e.g., id. ("How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the
profits to them?").
88. ANDREw TYLECOTE & FRANCESCA VISINTIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
FINANCE AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 16 (2008) (alterations and
footnote omitted).
89. RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS 317-18 (2007).
90. Id.; see also TYLECOTE & VIS1NTIN, supra note 88, at 16-17.
91. TYLECOTE & VISINTIN, supra note 88, at 17-18 (noting that managers have an
incentive to perform when they receive a profit-based bonus).
92. Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 2 (2001) (emphasis in
original).
93. TYLECOTE & VISINT N, supra note 88, at 17.
94. Id.
95. Id. But see James McConvill, Executive Compensation and Corporate
Governance: Rising Above the "Pay-for-Performance" Principle, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 413,
416 (2006) (arguing that the view of agency theorists regarding the importance of
remuneration is misguided; that executives are not principally motivated by money in
terms of their relationship with the company, nor is money the best mechanism to appeal
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There is an inherent conflict between managers and shareholders when it
comes to risk. Shareholders generally prefer high-risk investments that
have the potential to generate higher returns later on, and investors can
minimize risk by maintaining a diversified portfolio.96 Executives,
meanwhile, whose investment portfolios may be significantly invested in
their own firms, are more inclined to avoid these same high-risk
investments that may not return positive short-term yields.
97
There is evidence that managers are exploiting a flaw in the
interrelationship between the principal-agent and shareholder value
approaches. Commentators have argued that these approaches have
distracted corporations from their substantive business models causing
them to pursue increasing share prices. 9 8 In a continual attempt to increase
share prices, directors resort to share repurchases, restructuring, and
reshuffling finances, such as changing inventory valuation methods,
accelerating income, deferring expenses, and changing pension actuarial
assumptions.99 For example, from the fourth quarter of 2004 through the
third quarter of 2008, companies in the S&P 500, as a group, earned
revenues of $2.42 trillion and distributed $2.64 trillion to shareholders
through dividends and stock buy-backs. 100 As noted by O'Sullivan, the
"alignment of the interests of the strategic managers of US public
corporations with the demands of the stock market is now typically
regarded as a defining feature of the market-oriented U.S. system of
corporate governance. '
to the interests of executives).
96. Barry D. Baysinger, Rita D. Kosnik & Thomas A. Turk, Effects of Board and
Ownership Structure on Corporate R&D Strategy, 34 ACAD. MGMT. J. 205, 205 (1991).
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND
ITS UNDOING 7 (2004). But see Matheson & Olson, supra note 73, at 1332 (suggesting
the conflicts between shareholder and manager interests are more subtle; "the pursuit of
longterm stability, the reinvestment of earnings, and the growth and diversification of the
corporate business tends to solidify the corporate enterprise and maintain managers in
their positions").
99. Leslie Wayne, Focus On: Stock Prices; A Look at New Corporate Tactics, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1984, § 3, at 6.
100. Floyd Norris Notions on High and Low Finance, Shareholder Value, N.Y. TMES,
Dec. 10, 2008, http://norris.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/10/shareholder-value/?pagemode
=print (Dec. 10, 2008 11:31 EST) (reporting that stock buybacks totaled $1.73 trillion
and dividends totaled $0.91 trillion).
101. O'SULLIVAN, supra note 51, at 70. This market oriented approach was also
emphasized when the first significant federal legislation was enacted in the twentieth
century to protect shareholders. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
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"Innovation is the process through which productive resources are
developed and utilised to generate higher quality and/or lower cost
products than had previously been available."' 10 2 And it is corporate
governance that influences how corporations allocate resources and
returns; it "shapes who makes investment decisions in corporations, what
types of investments they make, and how returns from investments are
distributed."' 0 3  Tylecote and Visintin found that United States
corporations that are directly controlled by shareholders, family- and
venture capital-dominated firms, tend to be governed for the longer view;
whereas firms with substantial outside shareholder interest tend to focus
on maximizing shareholder value and spend relatively less on research and
development. 10 4 Other commentators have reached similar conclusions:
Hayes and Abernathy have argued that lower post-WWII productivity
growth in the United States, compared to Germany and Japan, was due in
part to management's focus on short-term cost reduction rather than long-
term development of technological competitiveness. 10 5 A decade later,
Porter concluded that the innovative shortcomings of American businesses
were the result of short time horizons, ineffective corporate governance,
and high costs of capital-all symptoms of larger problems within the
United States' capital investment system.'
0 6
"To be successful, corporations must innovate to provide products and
services that their customers prefer to competitive alternatives. This
continual innovation is a risk-oriented process which entails the possibility
of failure and inadequate economic results."' 0 7 Corporate decisions to
carry on R&D activities "are typically, risky, unpredictable, long-term
(2006), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2006),
focused more on maintaining confidence in the market for corporate securities rather than
on corporate governance. HURST, supra note 22, at 91. The emphasis was on the
disclosure of material facts for the benefit of investors, leaving the "policing" to the
markets. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 98, at 4-5.
102. Mary O'Sullivan, The Innovative Enterprise and Corporate Governance, 24
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 393, 393 (2000).
103. Id. at 394.
104. TYLECOTE & VISINTIN, supra note 88, at 95-96.
105. Robert H. Hayes & William J. Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic
Decline, HARV. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1980, at 67, 67-68 [hereinafter Hayes &
Abernathy, 1980].
106. Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital Investment
System, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65, 65.
107. Statement of the Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American
Competitiveness, March, 1990, 46 BuS. LAW. 241, 242 (1990).
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oriented and multistage, labour intensive and idiosyncratic."' 10 8 Studies
have identified a relationship between stock ownership and risk-taking;
namely, corporations with large numbers of stockholders engage in fewer
and less risky R&D projects. This appeared to be especially critical in the
1980s, as United States firms faced stagnation in productivity coupled
with increased competition from countries like Japan who began gaining
prominence in both internal and external markets.'0 9 In the 1980s, with
American corporations beginning to experience significant competition
from overseas competitors, "US corporate managers faced a strategic
crossroads: they could find new ways to generate productivity gains on the
basis of 'retain and reinvest,' or they could capitulate to the new
competitive environment through corporate downsizing."' 110 The focus of
corporate activities shifted to maximizing shareholder value by
externalizing costs.1"'
Although studies have indicated that corporations with large numbers
of stockholders engage in fewer R&D projects, there is still some debate
as to whether diverse stock ownership, particularly associated with
institutional investors, helps foster a low-risk, less innovative corporate
culture. 12 Institutional ownership of corporate stock grew from 12 percent
of New York Stock Exchange companies in 1949 to over 50 percent in the
108. Federico Munari & Maurizio Sobrero, Corporate Governance and Innovation, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION 13 (Mario Calderini,
Paola Garrone & Maurizio Sobrero eds., 2003) (citation omitted).
109. Id.
110. O'SULLIVAN, supra note 51, at 154.
111. Id.
In the past two decades there has been a noticeable shift in US
corporate behaviour away from a strategy of retaining both people and
money within corporate enterprises towards releasing them onto labour
and capital markets. To account for such actions, US corporate
managers have proclaimed that the prime, if not only, responsibility of
the corporation is to "create value for shareholders." For their success
in "maximizing shareholder wealth," these strategic managers receive
ample, and often exorbitant, personal rewards, even as most other
corporate employees experience lower earnings and less employment
stability.
Id. at 70.
112. Samuel B. Graves & Sandra A. Waddock, Institutional Ownership and Control:
Implications for Long-Term Corporate Strategy, 4 ACAD. MGMT. ExEC. 75, 76 (1990)
(noting the "increase in institutional ownership ... fueled by the growth in pension funds
following [enactment] of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of
1974").
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1980s across a number of industry sectors. 13 Some research has suggested
"that institutions are good investors and look for long-term gains from
their investments," and that "the large holdings of [institutional] investors
provide ... an incentive to monitor ... managers and influence firm
actions, if necessary. 1 4 However, Graves and Waddock concluded that
"[i]nstitutional investors, of necessity, evaluate their holdings largely
based on financial performance measures" and that "only a very small
percentage even consider a clear measure of long-term competitiveness ...
in their investment decisions;" that "the very size of the institutional
holdings has forced investment managers to become more active in
influencing the strategies of their portfolios of companies, so that
institutions influence corporate managers not only by their presence but by
their advice and influence in major corporate decisions;" and that
pressures imposed by institutional investors are "heavily weighted on the
short-term."" 1 
5
Strategies focusing on innovation are often considered high risk
because of the high failure rate of most innovations and the risk that a
successful innovation may be rendered obsolete by the technological
advances of a competitor.116 As a result, corporations are hesitant to
undertake these "high stakes gamble[s]" on innovation out of fear that
institutional investors will sell their stake in the firm. 1 7 Although
113. Id.
114. Rahul Kochhar & Parthiban David, Institutional Investors and Firm Innovation: A
Test of Competing Hypotheses, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 73, 73 (1996) (citations omitted).
Kochhar and David concluded that "institutions apparently do not invest for the short
term," but instead "look for long-term benefits from their investments." Id. at 82; see also
Baysinger et al., supra note 96, at 212-13 (speculating that "the prospect of high financial
returns attracts institutional investors to companies that engage in long-term R&D
strategies," or, in the alternative, "institutional investors who own large stakes in a
company's stock are less able to move ... in and out" of their ownership position and
therefore "try to influence the return of their investment by becoming [more] actively
involved in ... company[]management"); Gary S. Hansen & Charles W.L. Hill, Are
Institutional Investors Myopic? A Time-Series Study of Four Technology-Driven
Industries, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1 (1991) (finding evidence that higher levels of
institutional ownership may be associated with greater R&D expenditures).
115. Graves & Waddock, supra note 112, at 80.
116. Charles W.L. Hill, Michael A. Hitt & Robert E. Hoskisson, Declining US.
Competitiveness: Reflections on a Crisis, 2 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 51, 57 (1988).
117. Id. at 56-57. These concerns remain prevalent, as exemplified by the Harvard
Business Review's decision in 2007 to reprint Hayes' and Abernathy's 1980 article,
Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, noting that the article's analysis is still
relevant. Robert H. Hayes & William J. Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic
Decline, 85 HARv. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 2007, at 138; see also Hayes & Abernathy,
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commentators have argued that "short-termism," driven by shareholders
demanding "unsustainable ever-increasing (quarterly) earnings growth,"
has contributed to the current financial crisis, 18 these same commentators
do not acknowledge that directors bow to, and are rewarded by, these
short-term pressures, to the long-term detriment of their firms.
III. MODERN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS-
DEFERENCE TO DIRECTORS
Corporate law grants directors and officers significant deference when
seeking to maximize shareholder value, even when shareholders lose
substantial sums of money."l 9 Powers granted to the corporation and its
managers have been derived primarily through competition among the
states for corporate charters.' 0 States have sought to attract corporate
charters, primarily for the revenues they generate, by lowering incor-
poration costs and eliminating restrictions on corporate activities.
12 1
States that sought to maintain restrictions found that local businesses
would simply obtain foreign, i.e., out-of-state, charters. 122 As a result, as
one state loosened restrictions, other states followed. This race to the
bottom "was one not of diligence but of laxity.' ' '23 This argument is
supported by the history of the development of Delaware's General
Corporation Law. 124 Delaware corporation law provides significant
leadership in United States corporate governance standards because of
1980, supra note 105.
118. Posting of Martin Lipton, Theodore N. Mirvis & Jay W. Lorsch to HARV. L. SCH.
FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FiN. REG., The Proposed "Shareholder Bill of Rights
Act of 2009," http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/05/12/the-proposed-%e2%80%
9cshareholder-bill-of-rights-act-of-2009%e2%80%9d (May 12, 2009, 16:56 EST).
119. Officers and directors are apparently also still entitled to significant compensation
even when their companies' shareholder values decline. See, e.g., The Pay at the Top,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, http://projects.nytimes.con/executivecompensation
(reporting compensation data for 200 chief executives at 198 publicly traded companies).
For a majority of corporations, CEOs received increased compensation from 2007 to
2008, despite declines in their companies' share value over the same period. Id.
120. See supra Part I.
121. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-58 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
122. Id. at 557.
123. Id. at 559 (footnote omitted); see also John D. Ayer, The Role of Finance Theory
in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 53, 58 n.17 (1995); Cary,
supra note 44, at 664.
124. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
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Delaware's historic role as the preferred state of incorporation for large,
publicly-held corporations--over half the firms that generate 28 percent of
total American business revenues are regulated by the Delaware General
Corporation Law.'
25
A director's fiduciary duty to the shareholders has been characterized
as a "triad" of "due care, good faith, and loyalty."' 126 "That triparte
fiduciary duty does not operate intermittently but is the constant compass
by which all director actions for the corporation and interactions with its
shareholders must be guided."' 127 As laudable as these duties may be, in
practice, they may now actually be anachronistic.
It is argued that "[w]ealth is maximized when corporations are run by
directors who know that their decisions will be reviewed by investors, by
analysts, by stockholders, and by business partners-but not by the
courts." 128 When Delaware courts look at director fiduciary duties, they
"balance specific policy considerations, such as the need to keep directors
and officers accountable to shareholders and the degree to which the threat
of personal liability may discourage beneficial risk taking."' 129 In practice,
the Delaware courts have continually granted great deference to director
decisions, as long as there was no overt intent to personally profit from the
decision or to harm the corporation.
For example, the Delaware Chancery Court recently considered a
complaint by Citigroup shareholders that the Citigroup board breached its
fiduciary duties by failing to understand the risks associated with the
firm's exposure to the subprime lending market. 130 The court began its
125. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
126. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).
127. Id.
128. David Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule, 32 J. CORP.
L. 301, 303 (2007) (footnote omitted). This same sentiment was echoed by the Delaware
Chancery Court-when directors make poor decisions, "redress.. .must come from the
markets, through the action of shareholders and the free flow of capital, and not from this
Court." In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005),
af'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
129. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 114 n.6 (Del. Ch.
2009).
130. Id. at 124. Though the facts in this case may seem a bit ironic in that Citigroup
appears to have taken excessive risks, ultimately it can be viewed as a case of seeking
short-term profits at the expense of long-term viability. See, e.g., Eric Dash & Julie
Creswell, Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at Al (reporting
that Citigroup risk managers charged with overseeing deal makers eager to increase
short-term earnings-and executives' multimillion-dollar bonuses-failed to rein them
in).
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analysis by distinguishing "between (1) a board decision that results in a
loss because that decision was ill advised or 'negligent' and (2) an
unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due
attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss."' 31 In the former case,
directors are protected by the business judgment rule and are not subject to
judicial second guessing short of evidence of gross negligence. 32 In the
latter case, to establish liability it must be shown that "the directors knew
they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations or that the directors
demonstrated a conscious disregard for their responsibilities such as by
failing to act in the face of a known duty to act."133 The Court summarized
the shareholders' claims as attempting to hold the directors "personally
liable for making (or allowing to be made) business decisions that, in
hindsight, turned out poorly for the [c]ompany."' 134 This type of decision-
making, according to the court, falls within the business judgment rule: "a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.
'135
The burden is on the shareholders who are challenging the directors'
decision to rebut this presumption. 13 6 [A]bsent an allegation of [self-]
interestedness or disloyalty to the corporation, the business judgment rule
prevents a judge or jury from second guessing director decisions if they
were the product of a rational process and the directors availed themselves
of all material and reasonably available information."']
37
The great deference to management decisions is tempered by the
notion that it is the shareholders who ultimately control the board of
131. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d at 122 (quoting In re
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
132. Id. Gross negligence has been defined as a "reckless indifference to or a deliberate
disregard of the whole body of stockholders or actions which are without the bounds of
reason." In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 750 (internal quotation
marks and footnote omitted).
133. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d at 123 (footnote omitted)
(emphasis in original).
134. Id. at 124. Citigroup's stock value dropped seventy-three percent from 2007 to
2008. The Pay at the Top, supra note 119.
135. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d at 124 (quoting Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)) (internal quotations omitted).
136. Id.
137. Id. "This doctrine also means, however, that when the company suffers losses,
shareholders may not be able to hold the directors personally liable." Id. at 139; see also
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 705-06 (Del. 2009) (holding same).
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directors. Corporate managers have a great deal of authority to pursue
business strategies, subject to certain constraints which assure that
managers will not abuse the powers granted to them.' 38 These constraints
supposedly instill confidence in investors that their capital may be safely
entrusted to corporate managers.' 39 In theory, shareholders may use their
voting power to displace elected representatives with whom they are
displeased.14  Arguably, this shareholder power instills a "fear of
replacement" in the directors, giving them incentive to serve the share-
holder interest and remain accountable. 14' This replacement power is
especially important when director decisions are insulated from judicial
review.
4 2
But in reality, at least for large, publicly-held corporations, the
"powers of corporate democracy" may be missing. 143 While shareholders
elect the directors, in actuality they are left with little opportunity to
actively participate in the director nomination process.' One major
impediment is Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(8), which regulates
shareholder proposals that can be included in proxy statements for
corporate annual shareholder meetings.145 Under this rule, a shareholder
must meet certain eligibility requirements in order to include their
proposal in the corporation's proxy statement. 46 However, a corporation
138. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response
to Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1759, 1762
(2006) (providing a list of some of these constraints-that "stockholders approve certain
important transactions such as mergers, vote for directors annually, and have access to
books and records; that stockholders can hold managers accountable for failing to fulfill
their fiduciary duties; and that state and federal policies give independent directors the
clout and duty to police corporate insiders") (footnotes omitted).
139. Id.
140. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985).
141. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REv. 675,
680 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Myth].
142. Id.
143. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus. LAW.
43, 44-45 (2003).
144. Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note 141, at 688 (concluding that even when
shareholder dissatisfaction with board actions and decisions is substantial, the evidence
indicates that "challengers face considerable impediments to replacing boards"); see also
Rose A. Zukin, We Talk, You Listen: Should Shareholders' Voices Be Heard or Stifled
when Nominating Directors? How the Proposed Shareholder Director Nomination Rule
Will Contribute to Restoring Proper Corporate Governance, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 937, 941
(2006).
145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2005).
146. See Am. Fed'n State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 462
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may exclude a shareholder proposal "[i]f the proposal relates to an
election for membership on the company's board of directors or analogous
governing body." 147 The result is that if shareholders wish to contest
directors nominated by the existing board, they have to prepare and
distribute their own proxy materials. 148
Empirical evidence suggests this is a substantial impediment.
Bebchuk examined contested director elections for publicly-held corpo-
rations during the decade 1996-2005. During the decade, there were only
118 director contests seeking to change the leadership team governing the
corporation. 149 The majority of the contests involved small firms; there
were only twenty-four such contests within firms with market
capitalization exceeding $200 million-and of those, only eight challenges
F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2006).
147. Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8)). On May 20, 2009, the Securities and
Exchange Commission voted to propose a new Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-11
which would permit owners of between 1-5 percent of an exchange-traded corporation's
voting stock, who have held the stock at least one year, the ability to include their
nominees for director in the company's proxy materials unless the shareholders are
otherwise prohibited--either by applicable state law or a company's charter/bylaws-
from nominating a candidate for election as a director. Press Release, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, SEC Votes to Propose Rule Amendments to Facilitate Rights of Shareholders
to Nominate Directors (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/
2009-116.htm. SEC Commissioner Elisse B. Walter has stated that she does not expect
the new rule to be adopted until 2010. Elisse B. Walter, SEC Comm'r, SEC
Rulemaking-'Advancing the Law' to Protect Investors, Speech at the 4th Annual
Corporate Counsel Institute, Northwestern University School of Law (Oct. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchl00209ebw.htm; see also infra
notes 162-63 and accompanying text (discussing a similar provision in the proposed
Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111 th Cong. (2009)); infra note 161 and
accompanying text (discussing an amendment to Delaware's General Corporation Law
permitting corporations to include in their bylaws provisions requiring the corporation to
include in proxy materials directors nominated by shareholders).
148. Zukin, supra note 144, at 940-41. According to critics of current shareholder
powers to challenge boards, there are structural impediments beyond Rule 14a-8(i)(8),
such as the cost to mail out separate proxies, staggered boards which result in less than a
majority of contested board seats in any one election, and the ability of shareholders to
"withhold" votes that do not count as a vote "against." Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note
141, at 688-91, 694, 701-04; see also infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text
(discussing the proposed Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 11 1th Cong.
(2009), which would eliminate staggered boards and require that directors be elected by a
majority of votes cast).
149. Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note 141, at 685. This is from the universe of firms
that filed proxy statements with the SEC during the decade. Id. at 682-84.
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were successful.15 0 During the 2008 proxy season, there were fifty-six
contests involving director elections in which shareholders distributed a
separate proxy; only eleven of these were successful.' 5'
IV. QUESTIONING THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY APPROACH
TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Anecdotal evidence suggests that shareholder-director interests are not
necessarily aligned and that the current corporate governance structure is
not sustainable based on concerns that American companies are losing
their competitive edge in innovation; 152 the near-collapse of the domestic
American automobile industry; 53  the transfer of manufacturing
overseas;1 54 and the stagnation of wages, 5 5 coupled with the exponential
rise in executive compensation. 156 Regarding the 2008-09 financial crisis,
one commentator has flatly stated: "There's no other way of saying it:
today's doctrines of shareholder primacy and managerial self-interest have
brought many companies to the brink of self-destruction."' 157 These
150. Id. at 686-87.
151. See GEORGESON, INC., 2008 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REvIEw, 46-47,
available at http://www.georgesonshareholder.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2008.pdf
(2008). Bebchuk used Georgeson, Inc. data in his analysis. Bebchuk, The Myth, supra
note 141, at 682-83 & n.16.
152. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS ET AL., MADE IN AMERICA: REGAINING THE
PRODUCTIVE EDGE 1 (1989) (noting that the U.S. buys far more overseas than it can sell
in other countries, that the U.S. rate of productivity improvement has fallen behind
several Western European and Asian nations, and that managers are criticized for seeking
quick profits rather than pursuing long-term goals); Steve Lohr, U.S. Said to be Losing
Competitive Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at B9.
153. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg & Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy: U.A. W.
and Fiat to Take Control, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at Al; David E. Sanger, Jeff Zeleny
& Bill Vlasic, G.M Heads to Bankruptcy Protection as Government Steps In: Obama
Makes a Bet That the Carmaker Can Recover, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at Al.
154. See KEvIN PHILLIPS, BAD MONEY 31 (2008) (noting that United States
manufacturing declined from just under thirty percent of GDP in 1950 to twelve percent
in 2005).
155. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, A Shopping Guernica Captures the Moment, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, § WK, at 3 (noting that "[w]ages for most Americans have fallen
in real terms over the last eight years").
156. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 154, at 67 fig.2. 10 (reporting the top compensation
of American CEOs in 1981: $5.7 million; 1988: $40.1 million; 2000: $290 million); The
Pay at the Top, supra note 119.
157. Simon Caulkin, Corporate Apocalypse, MGMT. TODAY, Jan. 1, 2009, at 50, 52;
see also Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial
[Vol. 1:047
BEYOND SHAREHOLDER VALUE
developments lend support to the argument of "[c]apital market myopia ...
as the determinant of lower levels of investment in innovation."' 58
Though not addressing corporate governance directly, Lewis and Einhorn
aptly describe the current situation: "Obviously the greater the market
pressure to excel in the short term, the greater the need for pressure from
outside the market to consider the longer term. But that's the problem:
there is no longer any serious pressure from outside the market.'
' 59
Pressure could come from the courts or shareholders. But the
Delaware courts have clearly indicated the business judgment rule is alive
and well. 160 The Delaware legislature has just enacted an amendment to
its General Corporation Law which permits corporations to include in their
bylaws provisions requiring the corporation to include in proxy materials
directors nominated by shareholders, 16 1 thus potentially eliminating one of
the major obstacles to shareholder control over the actions of the directors.
But the amendment only allows corporations to include this provision; it
does not require them to do so. It is too early to know whether this change
will have significant impact on corporate governance.
Meanwhile, Congress has taken an interest in corporate governance
and sustainable business prosperity. It has found that the widespread
failure of corporate governance has been a leading cause in the current
financial crisis, noting specifically that management has failed to adopt
compensation policies linked to long-term profitability, as well as remain
accountable to their shareholders. 1
62
Crisis, 96 FIN. MARKET TRENDS 1, 2 (May/June 2009), available at http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/32/1/42229620.pdf (concluding that "[t]he financial crisis can be to an
important extent attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance
arrangements").
158. Munari & Sobrero, supra note 108, at 5.
159. Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, Editorial, The End of the Financial World as
We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, § WK, at 9.
160. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
161. 77 Del. Laws 14 (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112-13 (2009); see also supra
note 147 (discussing the Securities and Exchange Commission's vote to propose a new
Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-1 1 which would permit qualified shareholders the
ability to include their nominees for director in the company's proxy materials, if also
permitted by the company's charter/bylaws).
162. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 11 1th Cong. § 2 (2009),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=l 1 lcongbills
&docid=f:s1074is.txt.pdf. The House of Representatives has introduced a similar act,
Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009, H.R. 2861, 111 th Cong. (2009), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname = 11 l_congbills&docid=f:h28
61 ih.txt.pdf.
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The Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009 would require the SEC to
amend its rules to allow shareholders who have owned at least one percent
of the company's voting shares for at least two years to use the company's
proxy materials to nominate members of the board of directors. 163 While
the Delaware and potential federal legislation are aimed at strengthening
shareholder powers, shareholders are not the only constituents that have a
stake in a corporation's activities. In the 1980s, Freeman argued that
businesses were facing increasing needs to interact with external forces
and pressures.164 Freeman recognized that in order to be successful,
managers needed to adapt to strategic shifts in their operating
environment, which required recognizing not only the priorities of the
shareholders, but also the needs of external stakeholders-including
employees, suppliers, local citizens and community organizations,
governments, and customers. 165  Justification for maximization of
shareholder value is based on the fact that "shareholders are the only
economic actors who make investments in the corporation without any
contractual guarantee of a specific return."'166 "As 'residual claimants,'
shareholders thus bear the risk of the corporation's making a profit or loss
and have an interest in allocating corporate resources to their 'best
alternative uses' to make the residual as large as possible."', 67 The
argument is that "[s]ince all the other stakeholders in the corporation will
receive the returns for which they have contracted, the 'maximization of
shareholder value' will result in superior economic performance not only
for the particular corporation but also for the economy as a whole."'
' 68
163. S. 1074, § 4. The Act would also require that in proxy materials, companies must
provide for an advisory vote on the compensation packages for executives, and that in
any acquisition, merger, consolidation, or proposed sale or other disposition of
substantially all of the assets of a company, it must disclose, and provide an advisory
shareholder vote on, any type of compensation for executives of the issuer or acquiring
issuer. Id. § 3. In order to remain listed on stock exchanges, issuers must elect a
Chairperson of the Board of Directors who is not currently serving, and has not
previously served, as an executive officer of the issuer, eliminate staggered boards, elect
board members only by a majority of shareholder votes cast, and maintain a risk
committee comprised entirely of independent directors, responsible for the risk
management practices of the issuer. Id. § 5.
164. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH
23 (1984).
165. Id. at 24-25.
166. Id.
167. O'SULLIVAN, supra note 51, at 43.
168. Id. This argument ignores, however, stakeholders who do not have contractual
claims on the corporation, such as members of the community who must suffer from
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Commentators are beginning to recognize, however, that there is an
alternative to the shareholder primacy approach to corporate governance
and that corporations have broader social responsibilities which include
economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary (i.e., philanthropic)
considerations. 69 Even the classical capitalist ideology-maximizing
shareholder value--"logically entails a market morality that makes
individuals and firms responsible for maximizing profits so long as they
comply with the law, adhere to familiar moral standards of honesty,
fidelity and fairness, and respect those individual moral rights that are
presupposed by capitalist market arrangements."
'1 70
Many of these broader social responsibilities were recognized over
fifty years ago by Bowen,171 who argued that the system of laissez faire-
i.e., a market-based exchange economy--declined because of conflicts
between individual and social interests, essentially because business
people did not achieve their moral obligations.
172
pollution emitted by the corporation.
169. Mark S. Schwartz & Archie B. Carroll, Integrating and Unifying Competing and
Complementary Frameworks: The Search for a Common Core in the Business and
Society Field, 47 BuS. & SOC'Y 148, 156 (2008).
170. Richard A. Rodewald, The Corporate Social Responsibility Debate: Unanswered
Questions About the Consequences of Moral Reform, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 443, 447 (1987).
171. HOWARD R. BOWEN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIEs OF THE BusINEssMAN 19 (1953).
Bowen summarized the historical moral obligations of business people:
(1) to observe the rules of property; (2) to honor contracts; (3) to refrain
from deception and fraud; (4) to be efficient and to promote economic
progress; (5) to protect life, limb, and health of workers and the general
public; (6) to compete vigorously, and in case of failure of competition
to act with restraint; (7) to accept and respect the economic freedoms of
consumers, workers, and owners; and (8) to have regard for the human
rights of workers.
Id.; see also Edwin M. Epstein, The Corporate Social Policy Process and the Process of
Corporate Governance, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 361 (1987) (discussing the American Law
Institute's proposed Principals of Corporate Governance § 2.01, which requires, inter
alia, that in the conduct of business, corporations "may devote a reasonable amount of
resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes").
172. See BOWEN, supra note 171, at 20. Bowen attributed the decline of laissez faire to
additional issues, familiar in modem society:
(1) growth of large-scale enterprise and concentration of economic
power; (2) fluctuating general business activity with recurrent periods
of unemployment; (3) technological unemployment; (4) personal
insecurity of people with reference to sickness, old age, and death; (5)
disparities in the distribution of income; (6) disparities in the
distribution of economic opportunity; (7) overly rapid and wasteful
exploitation of natural resources; (8) materialistic, competitive, and
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The federal government has served as a source of imposing social
responsibilities on businesses, in the form of laws such as the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969,173 the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890,174 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,175 and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.176 But, as Rodewald notes, "the legal mechanisms
through which government must act are an inherently crude, ineffective,
costly, and sometimes counterproductive means for controlling corporate
behavior," and additionally have a problem of being reactive with a time
lag that can result in irreparable damage between recognition of a problem
and enactment of legislation. 177
Rodewald further argues that "managers are morally responsible for
considering the likely human, social and environmental consequences of
the alternative courses of action open to them, as well as the interests of all
those who will be affected by their decisions.' 78 Rodewald concludes that
managers ultimately "should try to pursue the course of action that they
conclude, all things considered, is reasonable to expect will maximize
individual and social benefits over costs in a way that is consistent with
the requirements of social justice.' 179 These are significant respon-
sibilities. Conversely, Mayer expresses the more contrarian-and
cynical-view of the corporation's role in society: that business ethics "is
clearly an instrumental strategy rather than something worth doing for its
own sake."'
' 80
invidious standards of consumption; and (9) frequent disregard for the
social costs of economic activity and the social values that might be
derived from economic activity.
Id. at 21; see also, Daniel T. Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade? A Corporate
Executive's Social Responsibilities with Regard to Law, 41 AM. Bus. L.J. 559, 562-63
(2004) (discussing Bowen's view that the lapse of business ethics contributed to the
Great Depression).
173. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2006) (declaring an intent to prevent environmental
damage and increase ecological knowledge).
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38 (2006) (prohibiting restraints on trade).
175. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006) (prohibiting employment discrimination).
176. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (instituting extra checks and balances
in the securities forum).
177. Rodewald, supra note 170, at 453.
178. Id. at 455 (footnote omitted).
179. Id.
180. Don Mayer, Fort's 'Business as Mediating Institution'--A Holistic View of
Corporate Governance and Ethics, 41 AM. Bus. L.J. 595, 609 (2004) (footnote omitted).
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But if society as a whole cannot agree precisely which values should
be advanced, why should it be the responsibility of corporate managers?
18 1
Further, while theories promoting profit maximization may have their
flaws with respect to maintenance of long-term corporate sustainability,
sacrificing corporate profits in pursuit of nonmarket social goals can make
a firm uncompetitive and, ultimately, unsustainable.'
82
While some may argue the "era of self-interested companies trying to
maximize shareholder wealth at any cost appears to have been supplanted
by an era of corporate social responsibility,"' 83 firms must remain
financially viable. Trudel and Cotte found that "[c]onsumers are willing
to pay substantially more for ethically produced goods, suggesting that
there is a financial reward for socially responsible behavior."', 84 In
addition, Trudel and Cotte found that consumers will punish the producer
of unethically produced goods more than they will reward a company that
offers ethically produced goods: "The negative effects of unethical
behavior have a substantially greater impact on consumer willingness to
pay than the positive effects of ethical behavior."185
Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh performed a meta-analysis of the
empirical link between corporate social performance and corporate
financial performance through 167 studies over thirty-five years; they
found a positive, though small, link.186 In a follow-up discussion of the
meta-analysis, Margolis and Elfenbein suggest that while acting in a
socially responsible way may not be highly profitable, doing good does
not destroy shareholder value. 1
87
Porter and Kramer emphasize that business and societ are mutually
dependent and must make choices that benefit both sides.'18 Holcomb has
181. See Rodewald, supra note 170, at 458.
182. See id. at 463.
183. Remi Trudel & June Cotte, Does It Pay to be Good?, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV.,
Winter 2009, at 61, 61.
184. Id. at 67.
185. Id. (emphasis in original).
186. Joshua D. Margolis, Hillary Anger Elfenbein & James P. Walsh, Does It Pay to be
Good? A Meta-Analysis and Redirection of Research on the Relationship Between
Corporate Social and Financial Performance 2 (July 26, 2007), http://stakeholder.bu.edu/
Docs/Walsh,%20Jim%2ODoes%20]t%20Pay/o20to%20Be%20Good.pdf.
187. Joshua D. Margolis & Hillary Anger Elfenbein, Do Well by Doing Good? Don't
Count on lt, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan. 2008, at 19.
188. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. Bus. REV., Dec.
2006, at 78, 83 (arguing that corporations need a healthy society to create expanding
demand for business; meanwhile society needs successful companies to create jobs and
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observed that there is "pressure to build a business case for social
involvement as an integrated part of firm strategy."'189 He notes that
"concepts of corporate responsibility and sustainability have gained
increasing momentum as measurements of corporate perfor-mance[:] ...
companies are beginning to embrace the idea that corporate responsibility
can be good for business performance[;]" recent surveys indicate a
majority of consumers expect firms to be involved with social causes;
there is growing belief among global CEOs that "corporate responsibility
measures can help firms manage legal liabilities, financial performance,
reputation, and relations with stakeholders[;]" reports covering non-
financial information (such as sustainability, triple bottom line, and
environmental, health, and safety issues) are growing in significance; and
"[a]n increasing number of institutional investors are becoming interested
in approaches to asset management that include environmental, social, and
corporate governance criteria or metrics."'
' 90
Commentators are now arguing that for a corporation to be truly
sustainable, it will have to adopt a stakeholder, rather than a shareholder,
value approach; stakeholder engagement and collaboration are necessary
conditions for a sustainable business model. 19 Wheeler, Colbert, and
Freeman argue that for a firm to be sustainable, the notion of corporate
social responsibility-"an ethical appeal to organizational leaders to
minimize the harm done by corporations in the pursuit of profits and, in
some cases, to make a case for linking conventional philanthropy to con-
structive community involvement"--must include additional stake-
holders. 1  Wheeler and his colleagues recognize that business value
pay taxes).
189. John Holcomb, Changing the Game: Reforming American Business: 2005 Update
Report, Changing the Game Forum, Vail Leadership Institute, Center for Corporate
Change, June 2005, at 3 (on file with author).
190. Id. at 12-13; see also id. at 14-15 (summarizing the relationship between financial
performance and corporate responsibility, particularly that corporate responsibility
"performance done correctly and strategically has a positive impact on business
success[]"). "Triple bottom line" is a paradigm "that a corporation's ultimate success or
health can and should be measured not just by the traditional financial bottom line, but
also by its social/ethical and environmental performance." Wayne Norman & Chris
MacDonald, Getting to the Bottom of "Triple Bottom Line, " 14 Bus. ETHICS Q. 243, 243
(2004).
191. See Wendy Stubbs & Chris Cocklin, Conceptualizing a "Sustainability Business
Model, " 21 ORG. & ENv'T 103, 122 (2008).
192. David Wheeler, Barry Colbert & R. Edward Freeman, Focusing on Value:
Reconciling Corporate Social Responsibility, Sustainability and a Stakeholder Approach
in a Network World, J. GEN. MGMT., Spring 2003, at 1, 15.
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creation can be regarded from different perspectives.193 They believe that
"a business model that places value creation at its core will allow concepts
of CSR [(corporate social responsibility)], sustainability and the
stakeholder approach to find their natural homes, whether at a strategic or
a managerial level."' 94 They have also developed a three-tier model to
explore how firms may create value across the three dimensions of the
aspirational notion of sustainability, i.e., economic, social, and ecological
priorities 95 (also referred to as the "triple bottom line").
Wheeler recognizes, however, that "embracing stakeholder notions of
value and striving for sustainability are consistent but not synonymous."'
96
Ultimately, they argue, a sustainable business model does not have to be a
theoretical ideal. "Whether it is a recognition of the strategic value of
reputation, or brand value, few business leaders today ignore the tangible
business benefits of loyal, trust-based relationships with networks of
customers, suppliers and distributors."' 97 According to Wheeler, "the
evidence is now mounting that what is said to one stakeholder group, i.e.,
the investors, need no longer be in conflict with what is said to employees,
customers, supply chain partners and local communities."'
' 98
Criteria have already been established to assist corporations in
assessing expanded social responsibility activities. For example, the
Global Reporting Initiative has developed a reporting framework in which
corporations can detail their economic, environmental, and social impacts;
identify their stakeholders and explain how the corporation has responded
193. Id. at2.
194. Id.; see also Callahan et al., supra note 82, at 183 (arguing that a blended model
of corporate governance that enhances individual moral identity by structuring the
organization as a community that nourishes moral virtue would have particular efficacy
in limiting corporate wrongdoing).
195. Wheeler et al., supra note 192, at 10.
196. Id. at 17.
197. Id. at 19 (footnotes omitted).
Some would argue that the best firms have always sought to leverage
their communities of interest for the instrumental purpose of creating
value. In many cases they have done this by balancing (or ideally
integrating) stakeholder interests and combining them with a clear
vision of what is achievable for customers, employees, investors and
other stakeholders-whatever their corporate officers may have said to
the analysts or investors at annual general meetings.
Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).
198. Id.
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to the stakeholders' reasonable expectations and interests; and present the
organization's performance in the wider context of sustainability. 1
99
V. EVOLVING NORMATIVE STANDARDS FOR
SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In the relatively short history of the modem, publicly-held corporation
in the United States, a convergence of factors has led to what is arguably
an unsustainable corporate governance model: states engaged in a
legislative race to the bottom which gave corporate directors almost
unlimited powers to control corporate activities; 20 corporate ownership
became separated from control as ownership became more dispersed;
20 1
the tandem rise of the shareholder primacy and agency theories
encouraged low-risk, short-term returns over innovation and long-term
prosperity; 202 all of which are supported by a business judgment rule that
refuses to question director conduct short of misappropriation or gross203
misconduct. Executive compensation policies out of sync with long-
term profitability and a lack of management accountability to shareholders
have been identified as contributing factors to the current financial
crisis.
20 4
But there has recently been a strategic shift in the corporate operating
205environment. 2° There is a growing recognition that there are others
besides managers and their shareholders who have an economic stake in
corporate activities. This shift goes beyond consumers demanding that
businesses behave ethically.20 6 There is increasing momentum to demand
more than just improved financial performance; shareholders are also
demanding improved social and environmental performance as well.20 7
Shareholder value can be maximized, in the long run, when managers act
199. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, DEFINING REPORT CONTENT, http://www.global
reporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/DefiningReportContent (last visited Jan.
26, 2010).
200. See text accompanying notes 57-58.
201. See text accompanying notes 74-78.
202. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 98-101.
203. See text accompanying note 137.
204. See text accompanying note 162.
205. See text accompanying note 165.
206. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 189-90.
207. See Rachel Kyte, Balancing Rights with Responsibilities: Looking for the Global
Drivers of Materiality in Corporate Social Responsibility & the Voluntary Initiatives
That Develop and Support Them, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 559, 566 (2008).
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in the best interests of those who also have a stake in the success of the
corporation-such as employees, suppliers, customers, and society. If
corporate activities promote a healthy society, that society, in return, can
support an environment of business growth.2 °8
While the shareholder value perspective continues to dominate
corporate governance, direct incentives can be provided to encourage
companies to incorporate stakeholder perspectives, particularly by
participating in reporting standards such as those developed by the Global
Reporting Initiative.20 9 Dividends could be distributed tax-free and/or
capital appreciations could be tax-free or taxed at a lower rate for
corporations that can certify compliance with social responsibility
reporting requirements. In this way, the same market forces that
contributed to the unsustainability of corporations can be used to reverse
that trend. "Stakeholder capitalism bases our understanding and
expectations of business, not on the worst that we can do, but on the best.
It sets a high standard, recognizes the common-sense practical world of
global business today, and asks managers to get on with the task of
creating value for all stakeholders."
210
CONCLUSION
The corporate form of business organization has a long and important
role in the American economy. From its earliest formal origins,
investments by shareholders were protected by legally imposed fiduciary
duties on corporate directors. Over time, these duties have morphed into a
mantra for maximizing shareholder wealth. But lately, maximizing share-
holder wealth has meant achieving continuing short-term stock price
gains, sometimes to the detriment of the long-term health of the
corporation. This Article has suggested that corporations can redirect their
focus to long-term sustainability by expanding corporate governance
standards to encompass multiple stakeholders and allowing corporations to
mitigate their impact on the environment and society so as to increase their
odds of long-term survival.
A review of the literature analyzing stakeholder value and corporate
social responsibility philosophies reveals wide disparity in approach-
from completely altruistic/society first, to simply avoiding harmful or
208. See text accompanying note 188.
209. See text accompanying note 199.
210. R. Edward Freeman, Business Ethics at the Millennium, 10 Bus. ETHICS Q. 169,
178 (2000).
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unethical behavior and illegal activities. Logically, there must be a middle
ground in which refined corporate governance norms can be established to
promote sustainable business enterprises-for both shareholders and
society. A significant amount of empirical and anecdotal evidence
suggests that the current mantra of maximizing shareholder value is not
sustainable. And since this approach to business is fully supported by
current laws, it will require management, and perhaps proactive
shareholders, to lead corporations in new, sustainable directions. The race
to the bottom which laid the foundation for current corporate governance
standards can perhaps be reversed, driving a race to the top.
2 11
211. See Kyte, supra note 207, at 565.
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